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Introduction 
As a whole, while institutional investors respond to analysts’ target price revisions, this trading 
behaviour does not yield any excess returns (Lin et al., 2016). This may be due to the fact that, 
when released, the information provided by sell-side analysts is in the public domain and is, 
therefore, less profitable compared to trading on private information (Kacperczyk and Seru, 
2007). However, institutional investors have varied access to private information, particularly 
foreign institutional investors, who are commonly regarded as the least informed of all groups 
(Baik et al., 2013). Sell-side analysts’ target price revisions could, therefore, provide an important 
source of information to help foreign institutional investors identify profitable trading 
opportunities in the U.S. equity market. However, whether and how foreign institutional investors 
respond to analysts’ target price changes is unclear. 
 
  Foreign institutional investors are regarded as large and sophisticated money managers with 
the ability to process and respond to public information, such as analysts’ forecasts, in a timely 
manner (e.g., Brennan et al., 2005; Ferreira et al., 2017; Kacperczyk et al., 2018). However, rather 
than collecting and processing public information on firms in foreign markets, foreign institutional 
investors have been shown to exhibit a home bias and failed to act in a timely manner to 
information on their foreign holdings (e.g., Hau and Rey, 2008; Forbes, 2010; Baik et al., 2013). 
We, therefore, examine whether foreign institutional investors respond to analysts’ target prices 
and, if so, the profitability of such trading. 
 
  Using 51,427 firm-quarter observations between 2003 and 2013 in the U.S. equity market, it 
is found that foreign institutional investors not only respond to analysts’ target price revisions, but 
also predict significant excess returns when doing so. The results are robust to controlling for 
other analysts’ outputs, such as revisions to their earnings’ forecasts and stock recommendations, 
in addition to other determinants of institutional trading. These results are robust using different 
measures of institutional trading. The results also show that foreign institutional trading based on 
target prices’ revisions is more pronounced in firms with high information asymmetry. The results 
show that foreign institutional investors rely more on analysts in small firms and firms with low 
analyst coverage. Taken together, the results in this paper support the view that foreign institutions 
benefit from “listening” to sell-side analysts who can help alleviate their relative information 
disadvantage when investing in foreign markets.This paper proceeds as follows. The next section 
discusses the relevant literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology 
while section 4 shows the descriptive statistics and section 5 outlines the results. Finally, Section 
6 presents the conclusions. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Most foreign investments are channelled through institutional investors (Abdioglu et al., 2013), 
who prefer geographically close, well-developed markets, with a common language (Chan et al., 
2005). While the literature agrees on the main determinants of foreign institutional ownership, the 
impact of such ownership remains highly debatable. On the one hand, foreign institutional 
ownership is associated with better and high-quality financial reporting comparability (Fang et 
al., 2015; Beuselinck et al., 2017), long-term investment and innovation output (Bena et al., 2017) 
and more informative prices on the firm level (Kacperczyk et al., 2018). On the other hand, foreign 
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institutional investors are geographically distant (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), have cultural 
barriers (Kim et al., 2016) and are home-biased (Kang and Stulz, 1997). One of the main reasons 
behind the presence of the home-bias phenomenon is the information asymmetry gap between 
foreign and domestic investors (Kalev et al., 2008). While overall institutional investors are more 
informed than other investors in the capital market (Hendershott et al., 2015), foreign institutional 
investors are at an information disadvantage compared with their domestic peers (Kang and Kim, 
2010).  
 
  Therefore, foreign institutional investors have always been interested in firms with high 
quality of corporate disclosure (Aggarwal et al., 2005; Gelos and Wei, 2005; Covrig et al., 2007). 
Foreign institutional investors also prefer large, liquid firms with low information asymmetry 
(Baik et al., 2013; Abdioglu et al., 2015) and firms with higher levels of governance (Aggarwal 
et al., 2011), a large number of foreign operations (Cai and Warnock, 2012), and high analyst 
coverage stocks (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Kacperczyk et al., 2018).  Similarly, foreign 
institutional investors prefer investing in the U.S. due to the development of their financial system 
(Forbes, 2010), in large, liquid firms that are followed by higher numbers of analysts. Yet, they 
generate lower future return compared with their domestic peers (Baik et al., 2013). This can be 
explained by the poor stock picking abilities to foreign institutional investors. However, whether 
and how analysts’ forecasts help foreign institutional investors to mitigate their information 
disadvantage remains largely unexplored.  
 
  Analysts disseminate financial information to various users, including institutional investors, 
whose demand, for financial information motivates analysts to follow the firms to benefit from 
the trading commissions (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990). Further, brokerage houses’ dependency 
on institutional investors for trading commissions leads to a high association between the 
informativeness of analysts’ research and the percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
(Frankel et al., 2006). This relationship between analysts and institutional investors has led to a 
field of research that studies the relative importance of various types of analysts’ outputs to 
institutional investors such as earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices.  
  As a group, institutional investors rely on analysts’ earnings’ forecasts (Walther, 1997), trade 
based on information contained in target prices (Lin et al., 2016) and generate excess returns when 
trading on analysts’ stock recommendations (Chen and Cheng, 2006; Green, 2006; Irvine et al., 
2007). However, when considering their size, large sophisticated institutional investors appear to 
be more aware of the inherent bias and conflicts in analysts’ recommendations, compared to small 
investors who naively follow the analysts’ advice (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007; Mikhail 
et al., 2007; Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014). Consequently, small investors generate 
significantly lower abnormal returns, compared to large investors who, being aware of the 
analysts’ biased recommendations, place comparatively more weight on the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014).  
 
  Except for the before mentioned studies examining the differential effects of the investors’ 
size, institutional investors are generally regarded as a homogenous user of analysts’ outputs. 
However, foreign institutional investors differ significantly in both their demand for and ability 
to acquire, information on their foreign shareholdings. Compared to domestic institutional 
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investors, foreign institutional investors are more sensitive to public information (Brennan et al., 
2005) and their trading behaviour differs according to the level of analyst coverage (Ferreira et 
al., 2017). Thus, a high analyst presence appears to be a valuable source of information to foreign 
institutional investors who are unfamiliar with the host-country capital market (Baik et al., 2013). 
However, foreign institutional investors may be home-biased and less inclined to gather and 
process information about fundamentals in foreign markets. To date, whether foreign institutional 
investors would benefit from trading based on analysts’ forecasts remains largely unexplored. 
Analysts’ reports include mainly stock recommendations, earnings forecasts and target price. 
 
    While previous literature focused on analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations, 
recently, scholarars started to focus more on analysts’ target prices. This increased attention is 
justified by the availability of data (Feldman et al., 2012). In addition, Asquith et al. (2005) 
mentioned that market reacts more to target price revisions compared with earnings forecasts 
revisions. Moreover, analysts explicitly express their opinions when setting target prices (Huang 
et al., 2009) and revise them more frequently than stock recommendations (Lin et al., 2016). 
Furthermore,   Analysts’ target price considered to contains distinct information, to which 
investors react, even in the presence of stock recommendation and earnings’ forecasts (Asquith et 
al., 2005). In contrast with stock recommendations and earnings’ forecasts, target prices are a 
verifiable signal that can easily be compared among analysts (Gleason et al., 2013).Therfore, this 
paper focuses on target prices revisions while controllong for earnings forecasts revisions and 
analysts stock recommendations.  
 
  Overall, institutional investors respond to target price revisions. Yet, this trading behaviour is 
not associated with any future returns (Lin et al., 2016). This might be explained by the proposition 
that fund managers who trade based on public information, such as analysts’ recommendations’ 
underperform their peers who trade based on private information (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007). 
Yet, not all types of institutional investors have access to the private information. In particular, 
foreign institutional investors have limited access to the private information. Therefore, they 
might benefit from analysts’ target price revisions. Thus, this paper tests the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Foreign institutional investors trade in the same direction as analyst target prices revisions. 
 
  Lastly and more importantly, we aim to shed light on the profitability of foreign institutional 
investors’ trading based on target prices’ revisions. While Lin et al. (2016) fail to find evidence 
that overall institutional investors’ reliance on target prices is associated with any future abnormal 
returns, this may be due to the lack of profitability of the public information compared to the 
private information to sophisticated money managers (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007). Yet, neither 
Lin et al. (2016) nor the above-mentioned papers shed light on the profitability of analysts’ 
forecasts for less informed institutional investors such as foreign institutional investors. Foreign 
institutional investors act as less informed than their domestic peers (Ferreira et al., 2017). In the 
U.S., foreign institutional investors have poor stock picking ability, which leads to significant 
negative future return (Baik et al., 2013). Thus, we propose that foreign institutional investors 
trading based on the analysts’ target price revisions will improve foreign institutional investors’ 
abilities to pick profitable stocks and, therefore, alleviate their information disadvantage in the 
capital market.  
 
AABFJ  |  Volume 14, No.5, 2020 
46 
  This proposition is also motivated by the debate surrounding the profitability of public 
information. On the one hand, institutional investors’ trading based on analysts’ stock 
recommendations leads to excess returns (Chen and Cheng, 2006; Green, 2006; Irvine et al., 
2007). On the other hand, reliance on publicly available information, such as analysts’ stock 
recommendations signals low managerial abilities (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007). Therefore, it is 
crucial to investigate the impact of following analysts’ forecasts on a unique type of institutional 
investors’ profitability. Therefore, this paper aims to test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Foreign institutional investors’ reaction to target price revisions will contribute positively to 
their future returns. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Institutional Investors Trading 
Various measures were used to proxy institutional trading in the prior literature. The key 
difference between these measures is the choice among the number of institutions and the number 
of shares they hold (Edelen et al., 2016). This paper uses various measures to proxy institutional 
trading, as explained below.  
We start by the most conventional measure in the literature, the changes in the percentage of 
institutional ownership. We follow Chen and Cheng (2006), Jiang (2010) and Lin et al. (2016), 
among others, and construct the first trading measure as follows: 
   it it it 1IO  (IO IO ) 100  (1) 
Where  
 IOit: is the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors at the end of the quarter  
scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the quarter.   
Yet, Sias and Starks (2015)   note that - for many firms - the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors might decline due to events which affect only the number of shares 
outstanding such as an employee stock option during the quarter. This type of event affects the 
percentage of institutional ownership without any real institutional trading. Thus, to overcome this 
issue, we adopt the measure proposed by Sias and Starks (2015) and calculate an alternative measure 
of foreign institutional trading as follows: 
it it-1
it
it
INST -INST
ΔINS  =
#Shares-Outstanding
×100  (2) 
where 
INSTit: the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors at the end of the current 
quarter. 
#Shares-Outstandingit: the number of shares outstanding at the end of the current quarter.  
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  However, Guo and Qiu (2016) propose that using changes in the number of institutional 
investors is a better measure of informed trading for several reasons. First, institutional investors 
are heterogeneous regarding their informativeness. Thus, more informed institutional investors 
buy and sell to less informed institutional investors, a behaviour which cannot be captured using 
the changes in the overall number of shares owned. However, both types of transaction are 
captured by the changes in the number of institutions.
4
 Second, substantial changes in the 
institutional ownership have a significant influence on the stock price and are easily observed by 
other investors in the market. However, the exit and entry decisions will only be observed by other 
investors on the date the 13F is filed. In addition, Edelen et al. (2016) argue that this measure 
provides an “equal-weighted account” to each manager, and overcomes the problems of the 
demands of a few large institutions. Furthermore, Edelen et al. (2016) argue that changes in the 
number of shares held by institutional investors might be due to portfolio rebalancing and the 
ongoing adjustment in the positions which represent trade without information, while there is a 
high probability that the entry and exit decisions are related to the presence of new information. 
  Thus, we will use the percentage of change in the number of foreign institutional investors as 
an additional proxy for their response to the target price revisions. This measure of institutional 
trading studies the wide institutional response (e.g., whether new managers are buying or selling 
based on the analysts’ outputs) by examining changes in the number of institutional investment 
managers in two subsequent quarters. Following Guo and Qiu (2016), the percentage change in 
the number of institutional managers holding a stock (∆MANit) is calculated as follows: 
  
it it - 1
it
it - 1
II - II
II  
II
100
 (3) 
Where  
IIit: is the number of foreign institutional investors who hold the stock at the end of the current 
quarter. 
 
The Model 
 
Prior studies have documented a positive association between overall institutional trading and 
earnings’ revisions, stock recommendations and target prices (Chen and Cheng, 2006; Lin et al., 
2016). In addition, research has found that analysts’ coverage is positively associated with the 
levels of foreign institutional trading (Ferreira et al., 2017). This paper contributes to both strands 
of literature by directly examining the usefulness of analysts’ forecasts to foreign institutional 
investors. Therefore, to test the first hypothesis, we extend the methodology of Chen and Cheng 
(2006) and Lin et al. (2016) to examine the foreign institutional investors trading based on target 
price revisions as follows: 
                                                                  
4 Guo and Qiu (2016) specifically argue that more informed institutions will buy from less informed institutions. 
Yet, less informed institutions are highly unlikely to liquidate their positions entirely. In such cases, changes in the 
number of institutions can capture what changes in the shares held cannot. 
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 0 1 2 3 4  
it-2,it it-4,it-2
  
5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 1  6 
= + + TRADING β β TP β EPS+β REC+ β TURN + β DIV
+ β + β  + β  + β  + β MRET +β MRET
+β VOL +β BETA+β SPindex+ β Tim
Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ
LOG(MV) PB PE
e+β Indust
SG
Δ Δ ry+ε
 (4) 
  where TRADING: is either ∆IO or ∆INST or ∆II for foreign institutional investors as 
explained in equations 1, 2 and 3. ∆TP is the quarterly percentage change in the target prices (TP). 
TP is the target prices at the end of the current quarter. Analysts’ target price at the end of the 
quarter is the average of all analysts’ target prices at the end of the quarter.  In this paper, we 
control for several variables that are shown in the extant literature to influence institutional 
trading. First, following Chen and Cheng (2006), we control for changes in stock 
recommendations (∆REC), which are shown to be associated with institutional trading. We also 
control for analysts’ earnings forecasts’ revisions (∆EPS) which are shown to positively impact 
institutional trading. Next, following Gompers and Metrick (2001), we also control for the 
quarterly changes in share turnover ratio (∆TURN), dividends (∆DIV), and the natural logarithm 
of market value LOG(MV), which proxy for institutional investors’ preference towards liquid, 
prudent and profitable stocks, which we expect to be positively associated with institutional 
trading. 
 
  While institutional investors may buy stocks with a high book-to-market ratio (Gompers and 
Metrick, 2001), they may, instead, prefer glamour stocks (Sharma et al., 2008; Chen and Cheng, 
2006). We, therefore, include a control for the book-to-price ratio (BP) but without predicting the 
direction of association with institutional trading. Institutional investors are expected to be 
positive-feedback traders who buy the past winners and sell the past losers. Momentum trading is 
captured using market-adjusted cumulative return in the prior two quarters (MRETit-2, it) as well 
as the adjusted cumulative return in the six months before the quarter t-2 (MRETit-4, it-2). Thus, 
MRETit-2, it and MRETit-4, it-2 are expected to be positively associated with institutional investors’ 
trading. Then, following Bennett et al. (2003), we control for institutional investors’ appetite for 
risk by including the quarterly changes in beta (∆BETA) and firm-specific volatility (∆VOL). We 
predict a negative association between institutional trading and ∆BETA, but a positive association 
between institutional trading and ∆VOL. Lastly, we also control for adding and dropping from the 
Standard and Poor index as the institutional investors should act as prudent investors (Gompers 
and Metrick, 2001). Thus, they are expected to trade in the firms following the index changes. 
Calculation of the control variables can be found in Table 1, below. 
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Table 1: Variables Definitions  
Variable  Definition 
IO_Ttl = The number of shares held by all institutional investors divided by the number of shares outstanding at 
the end of the current quarter 
IO_Dom = The number of shares held by domestic institutional investors divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the current quarter 
IO_For = The number of shares held by foreign institutional investors divided by the number of shares outstanding 
at the end of the current quarter 
ΔIO_Ttl = The quarterly change in the total institutional ownership (II_Ttl) 
ΔIO_Dom = The quarterly change in the total domestic institutional ownership (II_Dom) 
ΔIO_For = The quarterly change in the total foreign institutional ownership (II_For) 
II_Ttl = The number of all institutional investors in the firm in the current quarter 
II_Dom = The number of domestic institutional investors in the firm in the current quarter  
II_For = The number of foreign institutional investors in the firm in the current quarter 
ΔII_Ttl = The quarterly percentage change in the number of institutional investors (II_Ttl) 
ΔII_Dom = The quarterly percentage change in the number of domestic institutional investors 
ΔII_For = The quarterly percentage change in the number of foreign institutional investors (II_For) 
TP = The most recent consensus target price in the current quarter. 
∆TP = The quarterly percentage change in TP 
EPS = The most recent annual consensus earnings forecasts in the current quarter 
ΔEPS = The quarterly change in EPS scaled by the stock price at the end of the current quarter 
REC = The analysts’ consensus stock recommendation in quarter t, whereby recommendations are scaled as 
follows: 5. Strong Buy, 4. Buy, 3. Hold, 2. Sell and 1. Strong Sell 
∆REC = A dummy variable that equals one if consensus analysts upgrade their recommendations and zero 
otherwise 
TURN  
 
= The average of the monthly turnover ratio over the past six months preceding quarter t, whereby the 
monthly turnover ratio is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the month 
∆TURN = The quarterly change in TURN 
DIV = Cash dividend during quarter t divided by the stock price at the end of the current quarter  
∆DIV = The quarterly change in DIV 
MV = The market value of equity calculated as the number of shares outstanding at the end of the current 
quarter multiplied by the price at the end of the current quarter  
LOG (MV) = The natural logarithm of MV 
PB = The market value at the end of the current quarter divided by the book value of common equity at the 
end of the current quarter 
MRETt-2,t  = Market-adjusted cumulative monthly stock return over the preceding 6 months of the current quarter 
MRETt-4,t-2 
= Market-adjusted cumulative monthly stock return over the preceding 7 to 12 months of the current 
quarter 
VOL = Volatility calculated as the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of firm i in the six months 
preceding the current quarter 
∆VOL = The quarterly change in VOL 
BETA = Beta is calculated as the coefficients of a regression of the monthly return of the firm on the value-
weighted index return over the 36 months prior to the end of the quarter 
∆BETA = The quarterly change in BETA 
SPindex 
= A dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the stock was added to the Standard and Poor index, −1 if it 
was dropped from the same index and zero otherwise 
Dum_TP 
= An indicator variable that equals one if the value of Target price revisions is equal to or greater than zero 
and zero otherwise 
Analysts’ 
Coverage  
= The number of analysts issued earnings forecast from I/B/E/S summary file at the end of the current 
quarter 
SizeDummy 
= An indicator variable that equals one if the value of LOG(MV) is greater than the median of LOG (MV) 
in particular year and zero otherwise 
AnalystDummy 
= An indicator variable that equals one if the Analysts’ Coverage is greater than the median of analysts’ 
coverage in particular year and zero otherwise 
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Data and Sample Selection 
 
We start by collecting analysts’ annual earnings forecasts, annual cash flow forecasts, stock 
recommendations, and target prices for all U.S. companies from I/B/E/S from the second quarter 
of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2013.5 We then remove all observations with insufficient 
information to calculate quarterly revisions in earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, or 
target prices, and restrict the sample to firms with non-missing share prices from CRSP, traded on 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, and with share codes 10 and 11. This provides an initial sample 
of 124,025 firm-quarter observations as shown in Table 2. From this initial sample, we exclude 
20,966 firm quarter observations in the financial services industry and 11,191 firm quarter 
observations in the utility industry.  
 
 Next, we remove 8,446 firm-quarters with insufficient data on Thomson-Reuters 13F 
institutional holding database required to calculate the main institutional trading variables. In 
addition, for this paper, we also remove 3,067 firm-quarter observations with missing foreign 
institutional holding data. Since, in this paper, we are interested in the foreign institutional 
investors trading, we restrict the sample to firm-quarter observations which have the data required 
to calculate the foreign institutional trading variables. In addition, for this paper, we require the 
firm to be followed by at least three analysts.
6
 Therefore, we exclude 14,778 firm quarter 
observations. Finally, we exclude observations missing the required data needed to calculate the 
control variables from CRSP and COMPUSTAT. The final sample, therefore, consists of 2,834 
unique firms with 51,427 firm-quarter observations as shown in Table 2. We winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1% and 99% level to minimize the effect of outliers. 
  
Table 2: Sample selection 
 Firm - quarters 
observations  
Initial sample from I/B/E/S from 2003 to 2013 124,025 
Less: financial and utility firms (32,175) 
Less: firms missing institutional holding information from 13F (8,446) 
Less: firms missing foreign institutional trading information from 13F (3,067) 
Less: firms with less than three analysts' following (14,778) 
Less: firms missing information to calculate the controlling variables from CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT 
(14,132) 
Final Sample 51,427 
Notes:This table shows the sample selection process followed to arrive at the final sample of 51,427 U.S. firm-
quarters observations between the second quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2013. 
                                                                  
5 We start the sample period in the second quarter of 2003 to avoid any confounding effects of significant regulatory 
changes leading up to this date from Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement agreement. With the 
approval of Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, these changes aimed to increase the objectivity of analysts, restore 
confidence in the capital market and protect investors. 
6 We use the I/B/E/S earnings forecast summary file at the end of the quarter to determine the number of analysts 
following the firm. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the key variables are reported in Table 3 and show that institutional 
investors hold 72.5% of the shares (IO_Ttl) for the average firm-quarter, represented by 214 
institutional investors (II_Ttl). Splitting institutional investors according to their geographic 
presence shows that the majority of institutional investors in the U.S. are domestic. Specifically, 
on average, foreign/(domestic) institutional investors hold 5.1% (67.3%) of a firm’s shares in a 
given quarter, represented by 21/(193) institutional investors.  Related to analysts’ outputs, the 
average firm has target price of $33.3, an earnings forecast of $1.4 and consensus stock 
recommendation of 3.62 (REC). An analysis of the quarterly change in these outputs over the 
sample period shows that while analysts appear to raise their average target prices, they lower 
their earnings forecasts.  The descriptive statistics for control variables show that the sample has 
a small number of large firms as shown by an average/(median) market capitalization of $6.314 
billion/($1.251 billion) at the end of the quarter. Further, the average firm reports a market to book 
ratio of 3.28, a dividend yield of 0.2% and a cumulative market-adjusted return in the prior six 
months of 5.11%. The measure of share turnover (TURN) shows that on average, 22.5% of a 
firm’s shares were traded over each quarter. For the measures of risk, the average volatility 
(VOLit) in each quarter is 11.1% and the average beta (BETA) is 1.43. 
 
Table 3: Pooled Descriptive Statistics 
Variable p25 Mean sd p50 p75 
IO_Ttl 18.4% 72.5% 17.9% 76.5% 98.5% 
IO_Dom 16.4% 67.3% 17.1% 70.6% 94.0% 
IO_For 0.1% 5.1% 3.5% 4.7% 16.8% 
ΔIO_Ttl -2.21 0.136 4.96 0.171 2.61 
ΔIO_Dom -2.23 0.11 4.79 0.117 2.57 
ΔIO_For -0.476 0.016 1.61 0.047 0.644 
ΔINST_Ttl -2.15 0.356 5.18 0.236 2.77 
ΔINST_Dom -2.14 0.32 4.98 0.183 2.73 
ΔINST_For -0.466 0.028 1.61 0.053 0.652 
II_Ttl 93 214 206 143 252 
II_Dom 87 193 187 132 222 
II_For 6 21 22.8 11 28 
ΔII_Ttl -4.35 1.42 9.47 0.844 6.32 
ΔII_Dom -4.61 1.27 9.59 0.575 6.2 
ΔII_For -8.33 6.08 27.4 0 16.7 
TP 14.2 33.3 29.2 25.3 42.6 
∆TP -0.050 0.029 0.165 0.024 0.105 
REC 3 3.62 0.677 3.6 4 
∆REC 0 0.609 0.488 1 1 
EPS 0.377 1.4 1.85 1.09 2.13 
ΔEPS -0.003 -0.002 0.035 0.000 0.005 
TURN 0.118 0.225 0.159 0.181 0.279 
∆TURN -0.022 -0.001 0.052 -0.001 0.02 
DIV 0 0.002 0.003 0 0.003 
∆DIV 0 0 0.002 0 0 
MV 438 6314 16834 1251 4,050 
LOG (MV) 6.08 7.29 1.61 7.13 8.31 
PB 1.57 3.28 2.96 2.43 3.82 
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MRETit-2, it -0.121 0.0511 0.288 0.021 0.177 
MRETit-4,it-2  -0.122 0.059 0.303 0.025 0.187 
VOL 0.065 0.111 0.064 0.096 0.14 
∆VOL -0.024 -0.003 0.045 -0.002 0.02 
BETA 0.834 1.43 0.864 1.29 1.86 
∆BETA -0.102 -0.001 0.258 0.003 0.108 
SPindex 0 0.006 0.189 0 0 
Notes: This table summarizes the main sample statistics of key variables for the 51,724 firm-quarter observations 
in the sample of listed U.S. companies between the second quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2013. See 
Table 1 for variables’ definitions. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
 Institutional Investors’ Trading Based on Target Price Revisions 
Table 4 presents the regression estimates for Equation 4. We proxy foreign institutional trading 
using three different measures. Column 1 of Table 4 uses the quarterly change in the percentage 
of foreign institutional ownership (∆IO_For). Column 2 of Table 4 uses the quarterly change in 
the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the quarter (∆INST_For), while column 3 of Table 4 uses the percentage 
change in the number of foreign institutional investors as the dependent variable. All of the 
regressions include industry fixed effects using the 49 Fama-French classification in addition to 
time fixed effect.  We find that the coefficient of (∆TP) is positive and significant at 1% level 
across all regressions, consistent with the predictions in the first hypothesis. Foreign institutional 
investors trade based on analysts’ target prices even after controlling for analysts’ earnings 
revisions and stock recommendations. This trading is economically meaningful, as an increase in 
one standard deviation of target prices boosts foreign institutional trading by 0.32%. As a 
comparison, a one standard deviation increase of earnings’ forecasts revisions (∆EPS) and 
adjusted market return (MRETit-2, it) will boost foreign institutional trading by 0.015% and 
0.075%, respectively.  
 The results also show that foreign institutional investors’ trade based on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts revisions. Yet, we fail to find evidence that foreign institutional investors respond to the 
recommendations revisions as evidenced by Chen and Cheng (2006) who document that, overall, 
institutional investors respond to sell-side analysts’ recommendations. However, the results are 
consistent with Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) who argue that institutional investors do 
not trade based on the analysts’ recommendations. The results for control variables are consistent 
with prior studies and with the predictions in the methodology section. Specifically, we find that 
foreign institutional investors are momentum traders who buy the past winners and sell the past 
losers, evidenced by the significant coefficients of the two momentum variables. Although, using 
the  before mentioned model, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is few factors that can 
impact both the analysts forecasts and institutional trading, we tried to control for most of the 
variables that have been documented in the prior literature.7    
 
                                                                  
7 Thank you to one of our anonymous reviewers for mentioning this. 
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Table 4: Regression of Foreign Institutional Trading on Analysts’ Revisions 
VARIABLES ΔIO_For ΔINST_For ΔII_For 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔTP 0.191*** 0.228*** 24.264*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.818) 
∆EPS 0.422*** 0.428*** 18.900*** 
 (0.163) (0.163) (3.348) 
ΔREC -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.126 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.233) 
ΔTURN 0.317*** 0.393*** 6.238*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (2.319) 
ΔDIV -2.710 -3.249 69.851 
 (3.324) (3.317) (68.169) 
LOG(MV)  0.017*** 0.007** -1.095*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.074) 
PB 0.002 0.001 0.156*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) 
MRETit-2, it 0.259*** 0.297*** 7.668*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.437) 
MRETit-4,it-2 0.052*** 0.068*** 2.028*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.386) 
ΔVOL 0.076 0.087 0.234 
 (0.129) (0.129) (2.651) 
ΔBETA 0.015 0.017 -0.527 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.438) 
SPindex 0.032 0.045 1.646*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.603) 
Constant 0.310* 0.391** 14.735*** 
 (0.159) (0.158) (3.252) 
    
Observations 51,427 51,427 51,427 
    
Time Effect YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.422 0.420 0.160 
Adj. R-squared 0.421 0.419 0.159 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of the three proxies of foreign trading change in the percentage of 
institutional ownership (∆IO_For), changes in the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors 
(∆INST_For) and quarterly percentage of changes in the number of foreign institutional investors (∆II_For) on the 
analysts’ target price revisions (∆TP) and other determinates of institutional trading. Standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See Table 1 for variables’ definitions. 
 
 
 MRETit-2, it and MRETit-4,it-2. We also confirm that foreign institutional investors prefer 
liquid firms.  
 
 Yet, the prior analyses do not show how foreign institutional investors benefit from the 
analyses. In section 5.2, we will test whether foreign institutional investors trading based on 
analysts’ target prices will alleviate their information disadvantage and generate a future abnormal 
return. 
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 Future Returns Predictability, Foreign Institutional Trading, and Analysts’ 
 Revisions 
 
To examine whether foreign institutional investors might benefit from trading based on target 
price revisions, we adopt the methodology of Gompers and Metrick (2001) and examine the 
association between the future returns in the subsequent quarter and the changes in institutional 
ownership as an indicator of the return predictability of institutional trading. Then, we follow the 
methodology of Brown et al. (2013) and interact the analysts target price revisions with foreign 
institutional trading to capture the impact of foreign institutional trading explained by target price 
revisions on the future stock return.
8
 We also modify Gompers and Metrick (2001) by using the 
measure of Sias and Starks (2015) for institutional trading in addition to the Guo and Qiu (2016) 
measure.  In columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 5, we use the cumulative market-adjusted return in the 
subsequent quarter as the dependent variable, while in columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5, we use the 
cumulative market-adjusted stock return in the subsequent year as the dependent variables. The 
results show that target price revisions are positively associated with market-adjusted return in the 
subsequent quarter, while foreign institutional investors’ trading is negatively and significantly 
associated with the future returns in the subsequent quarter. 
 
 The negative coefficient of changes in institutional ownership can be explained by their 
poor ability to predict the future return due to the information disadvantage they face as foreigners 
(Baik et al., 2013). While the link between foreign institutional investors’ trading and subsequent 
return has been shown by Baik et al. (2013), we aim to test whether the negative association can 
be alleviated by responding to analysts’ target prices revisions. Thus, in Table 5, we introduce the 
interaction term between foreign institutional trading and target price revisions’ indicator variable 
which is supposed to capture the incremental contribution of target price revisions on foreign 
institutional investors trading. 
 
 The positive sign of the coefficients of the interaction term suggesting that the institutional 
trading is explained by the target prices revisions decrease the negative relationship between 
foreign institutional trading and subsequent future return. The results are consistent using the three 
proxies of institutional trading. The positive sign of the coefficients of the interaction term 
supports the prediction in the second hypothesis that foreign institutional investors’ response to 
the analysts’ target price revisions contributes positively to foreign institutional investors’ 
profitability. 
 
 Following Yan and Zhang (2009), we also use the market-adjusted return in the subsequent 
year to check whether the impact of such trading lasts for a year. The result for the interaction 
term remains positive, but insignificant at the 5% level. This might be explained by the short-term 
value of analysts’ forecasts in general. 
                                                                  
8 To ease the interpretation, we transform the analysts’ target price revisions (∆TP) to an indicator variable that 
equals one if the analysts upgrade or did not change their forecasts and zero otherwise. The results remain similar if 
we use analysts’ target price revisions as a continuous variable.  
Al-Dmour, Zaidan & Alnatour | Usefulness of Analysts’ Target Prices to Foreign Institutional Investors 
55 
Table 5: Regression of Future Returns on Foreign Institutional Trading and Analysts’ Revisions 
VARIABLES Adj-Ret t:t+1 Adj-Ret t:t+4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dum_TP 1.734*** 1.735*** 1.691*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.190) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ΔIO_For -0.353***   -0.007***   
 (0.104)   (0.002)   
ΔIO_For×Dum_TP 0.292***   0.000   
 (0.113)   (0.002)   
ΔINST_For  -0.380***   -0.008***  
  (0.105)   (0.002)  
ΔINST_For×Dum_TP  0.286**   0.001  
  (0.113)   (0.002)  
ΔII_For   -0.012*   -0.001*** 
   (0.006)   (0.000) 
ΔII_For×ΔTP   0.016**   0.001*** 
   (0.007)   (0.000) 
IO_Forit-1 -6.629** -6.916**  -0.138 -0.141  
 (3.120) (3.133)  (0.118) (0.119)  
II_Forit-1   0.006   -0.001*** 
   (0.007)   (0.000) 
TURN -0.463 -0.439 -0.730 -0.056** -0.055** -0.060** 
 (0.697) (0.697) (0.686) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
DIV 45.875* 45.453* 44.082 0.334 0.322 0.649 
 (27.601) (27.595) (27.766) (0.965) (0.966) (0.967) 
LOG(MV) -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.355*** -0.005** -0.005** 0.004 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.114) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
PB -0.031 -0.031 -0.026 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MRETit-2,it -2.169*** -2.156*** -2.155*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.094*** 
 (0.378) (0.379) (0.378) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
MRETit-4,it-2 -1.443*** -1.441*** -1.411*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.048*** 
 (0.334) (0.334) (0.334) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
SPindex -0.636* -0.634* -0.640* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.335) (0.334) (0.335) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 7.654*** 7.687*** 7.998*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.072 
 (1.367) (1.367) (1.539) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) 
       
Observations 51,427 51,427 51,427 51,427 51,427 51,427 
       
Time Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.064 0.064 0.064 
Adj. R-squared 0.0582 0.0582 0.0580 0.0620 0.0621 0.0626 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of one quarter ahead and one year ahead market-adjusted return on 
foreign institutional trading, prior quarter analysts’ outputs, the interaction between foreign institutional trading and 
prior quarter target price indicator variable and other control variables. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See Table 1 for the variables’ definitions. 
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In an unreported test, we examine the price impact over a longer horizon to test whether foreign 
institutional investors trading based on analysts’ target price revisions cause return reversals. We 
fail to find any evidence of reversals over the four quarters or eight quarters following the period 
covered in Table 5. 
 
Further Analyses  
 
In this section, we follow Brown et al. (2013) and Lin et al. (2016) and use the prior quarter target 
prices and other analysts’ forecasts to ensure that we are not simply capturing simultaneous 
changes in analysts’ forecasts and institutional trading. This methodology also ensures that foreign 
institutional investors have sufficient time to respond to the information. Therefore, in Tables 6 
and 7, we repeat the initial analyses in Table 4 and Table 5 using the prior quarter analysts’ 
forecasts. The results remain qualitatively similar. Specifically, in Table 6, the coefficient of 
(∆TPit-1) remains positive and significant at 5% level across all regressions. In Table 7, the 
interaction term between the foreign institutional trading and the prior target price is positive and 
marginally significant at 10%. Overall, the prior results confirmed that foreign institutional 
investors respond to target price revisions.  
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Table 6: Regression of Foreign Institutional Trading on Lagged Analysts’ Forecasts Revisions 
VARIABLES ΔIO_For ΔINST_For ΔII_For 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔTPit_1 0.084* 0.107** 4.556*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (1.006) 
∆EPSit_1 0.550*** 0.400** 0.465 
 (0.161) (0.161) (3.343) 
ΔRECit_1 -0.017 -0.014 0.102 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.235) 
ΔTURN 0.307*** 0.381*** 4.661** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (2.341) 
ΔDIV -3.788 -4.451 -44.931 
 (3.321) (3.315) (68.753) 
LOG(MV)  0.018*** 0.009** -0.954*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.075) 
PB 0.003 0.003 0.289*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) 
MRETit-2, it 0.254*** 0.293*** 10.221*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.554) 
MRETit-4,it-2 0.043** 0.059*** 1.727*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.394) 
ΔVOL 0.089 0.099 1.611 
 (0.129) (0.129) (2.678) 
ΔBETA 0.015 0.015 -0.657 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.442) 
SPindex 0.033 0.046 1.754*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.609) 
Constant 0.295* 0.377** 14.650*** 
 (0.159) (0.158) (3.286) 
    
Observations 51,427 51,427 51,427 
    
Time Effect YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.422 0.420 0.144 
Adj. R-squared 0.421 0.419 0.142 
Notes This table presents the regression results of the three proxies of foreign trading change in the percentage of 
institutional ownership (∆IO_For), changes in the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors 
(∆INST_For) and quarterly percentage of changes in the number of foreign institutional investors (∆II_For) on the 
prior quarter analysts target price revisions (∆TP), and other determinates of institutional trading. Standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level 
clustering and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See Table 1 for variables definitions. 
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Table 7: Regressions of Future Returns on Foreign Institutional Trading and Lagged analysts’ Revisions 
VARIABLES Adj-Ret t:t+1 Adj-Ret t:t+4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dum_TPt-1 0.913*** 0.916*** 0.833*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.205) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
ΔIO_For -0.293***   -0.006***   
 (0.105)   (0.002)   
ΔIO_For×Dum_TPt-1 0.197*   -0.002   
 (0.115)   (0.003)   
ΔINST_For  -0.314***   -0.007***  
  (0.106)   (0.002)  
ΔINST_For×Dum_TPt-1  0.183   -0.001  
  (0.115)   (0.003)  
ΔII_For   -0.009   -0.000*** 
   (0.006)   (0.000) 
ΔII_For× Dum_TPt-1   0.016**   0.000* 
   (0.007)   (0.000) 
IO_Forit-1   0.001   -0.001*** 
   (0.007)   (0.000) 
II_Forit-1 -7.374** -7.633**  -0.158 -0.160  
 (3.161) (3.173)  (0.120) (0.120)  
TURN -0.711 -0.686 -0.962 -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.068*** 
 (0.705) (0.705) (0.695) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
DIV 34.802 34.404 34.435 -0.039 -0.051 0.339 
 (27.768) (27.764) (27.952) (0.972) (0.972) (0.973) 
LOG(MV) -0.192*** -0.191*** -0.267** -0.004* -0.004* 0.006 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.115) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
PB -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MRETit-2,it -2.212*** -2.202*** -2.243*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.095*** 
 (0.412) (0.412) (0.412) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
MRETit-4,it-2 -1.531*** -1.529*** -1.514*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.051*** 
 (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
SPindex -0.607* -0.604* -0.621* -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.335) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 8.315*** 8.345*** 8.296*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.081* 
 (1.386) (1.386) (1.552) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) 
       
Observations 51,427 51,427 51,427 51,427 51,427 51,427 
       
Time Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.061 0.061 0.061 
Adj. R-squared 0.0569 0.0569 0.0567 0.0589 0.0590 0.0593 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of one quarter ahead and one year ahead market-adjusted return 
on foreign institutional trading, prior quarter analysts’ outputs, the interaction between foreign institutional trading 
and prior quarter target price indicator variable and other control variables. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See Table 1 for variables definitions. 
 
 
Al-Dmour, Zaidan & Alnatour | Usefulness of Analysts’ Target Prices to Foreign Institutional Investors 
59 
 Institutional investors’ response to analysts’ target price revisions is more pronounced in 
small firms and firms with lower analysts’ coverage due to high information asymmetry in this 
type of firm (Lin et al., 2016). Therefore, the analysts’ opinion is more valuable to institutional 
investors. Consequently, we posit that foreign institutional investors will be more interested in 
analysts’ target price revisions for smaller firms and firms with lower analysts’ coverage. To 
examine the impact of size and analysts’ coverage, we use an interaction term for the firm size 
and analysts’ coverage with the target prices’ revisions. 
 
 Table 8 shows the estimates of the regression for Equation 4 in addition to the firm size 
and interaction term between analysts’ target price revisions and firm size. To ease interpretation, 
we transform the firm size variable LOG(MV) to a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
size is larger than the median of the firm size variable in a particular year and zero otherwise 
(SizeDummy). For brevity, we only report the firm size dummy variable, the target price revisions 
and the interaction term between the two variables. The results in Table 8 are consistent with Lin 
et al. (2016). Specifically, the coefficient of target price revisions is positive and significant for 
all regressions (∆TP), while the interaction term between the firm size and target price is negative 
and significant. Therefore, the results show that foreign institutional trading based on target prices 
is more pronounced for small firms and this association diminishes for large firms. 
 
 In Table 9, we show the estimates of the regression for Equation 4 in addition to the 
analysts’ coverage and the interaction term between analysts’ target price revisions and analysts’ 
coverage. To ease interpretation, we transform the analysts’ coverage (Analysts’ Coverage) to a 
dummy variable that equals one if the analysts’ coverage is larger than the median of the analysts’ 
coverage variable in a particular year and zero otherwise (AnalytDummy). For brevity, we only 
report the analysts’ coverage dummy variable, the target price revisions and the interaction term 
between the two variables.  
 
 The results show that the analysts’ coverage moderates the association between the target 
price revisions and foreign institutional trading. While the coefficient of target price revision is 
positive and highly significant, the interaction term between the number of analysts following the 
firm and target price revisions is negative and significant, suggesting that analysts’ target price 
revisions are less valuable to foreign institutional investors when the number of analysts covering 
the firm increases. Overall, the results in Table 8 and Table 9 show that foreign institutional 
investors value analysts’ target price revisions more when the firm is subject to high information 
asymmetry. 
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Table 8: Moderating Effect of Size on Foreign Institutional Investors Trading based on Analysts’ Target 
Price Revisions  
VARIABLES ΔIO_For ΔINST_For ΔII_For 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔTPit 0.300*** 0.315*** 25.814*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (1.251) 
SizeDummy 0.043*** 0.013 -2.954*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.158) 
SizeDummy×ΔTPit -0.334*** -0.263*** -5.509*** 
 (0.080) (0.079) (1.460) 
Constant 0.397*** 0.424*** 8.504*** 
 (0.059) (0.065) (1.412) 
Observations 51,427 51,427 51,427 
    
Control Variables YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.422 0.421 0.161 
Adj. R-squared 0.421 0.420 0.159 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of the three proxies of foreign trading change in the percentage of 
institutional ownership (∆IO_For), changes in the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors 
(∆INST_For) and quarterly percentage of changes in the number of foreign institutional investors (∆II_For) on the 
analysts’ target price revisions (∆TP), firms size dummy (SizeDummy), the interaction term between target price 
revisions and firms size dummy. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See 
Table 1 for variables’ definitions 
 
Table 9 Moderating Impact of Analysts’ Following on Foreign Institutional Investors Trading and Analysts 
Target Price Revisions 
VARIABLES ΔIO_For ΔINST_For ΔII_For 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔTPit 0.290*** 0.310*** 23.677*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (1.239) 
AnalystDummy 0.046*** 0.025*** -2.744*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.160) 
AnalystDummy ×ΔTPit -0.272*** -0.233*** -0.174 
 (0.082) (0.082) (1.494) 
Constant 0.407*** 0.424*** 7.813*** 
 (0.060) (0.063) (1.260) 
Observations 51,427 51,427 51,427 
    
Control Variables YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.422 0.421 0.160 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of the three proxies of foreign trading change in the percentage of 
institutional ownership (∆IO_For), changes in the number of shares held by foreign institutional investors 
(∆INST_For) and quarterly percentage of changes in the number of foreign institutional investors (∆II_For) on the 
analysts’ target price revisions (∆TP), number of analysts following dummy (AnalystDummy), the interaction term 
between target price revisions and number of analysts following dummy and other determinates of institutional 
trading. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. Standard errors are 
adjusted for firm-level clustering and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. See Table 1 for variables’ 
definitions 
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Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have examined the usefulness of analysts’ target prices to a unique type of 
investors. In particular, we have tested whether foreign institutional investors respond to revisions 
in target prices. More importantly, how such behaviour impacts the predictibality of stock returns 
in the subsequent quarter (2013), shows that foreign institutional investors are at an information 
disadvantage. Therefore, their earn negative future abnormal returns due to their poor stock 
picking ability in the host country. Building directly on that, we argued that analysts are informed 
users of financial information who disseminate valuable information to market participants. 
Therefore, foreign institutional investors might benefit from analysts’ target price revisions to 
identify mispriced stocks. In line with the prediction of this paper, we found a positive and 
significant increase in foreign institutional ownership in response to a positive change in analysts’ 
target prices, which leads to positive future abnormal returns. These results hold after controlling 
for a set of comprehensive factors that impact institutional trading. 
 
 Overall, we have provided evidence that analysts play a crucial role in disseminating 
information to different types of market participants, such as foreign institutional investors. More 
importantly, we show that foreign institutional trading based on analysts’ target price, promotes 
price discovery. Therefore, this paper has strong implications for enhancing our general 
knowledge of how foreign institutional investors can perform better in the capital market.  
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